Two Persistent Dimensions of Democracy: Contestation and Inclusiveness
There has been increasing quantitative research on the causes of democratization (Boix 2003; Geddes 2003; Huntington 1991; Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2005; Muller 1995; O'Loughlin et al. 1998; Przeworski et al. 1996) and on its consequences, from economic outcomes (Boix 2003; Przeworski et al. 2000) to the democratic peace (Enterline and Greig 2005; Maoz and Russett 1992) . Aligning theoretical and empirical dimensions is important for sound measurement, and therefore for empirical research employing those measurements. If a researcher assumes that a phenomenon varies along just one dimension but then constructs a single indicator of it by adding together some indicators of one dimension and some indicators from another dimension, she increases measurement error, which makes the phenomenon appear to be harder to explain than it should be and makes it appear to have less of an impact on other outcomes than it actually does. And because the extra empirical dimensions in the data create systematic measurement error, they bias the interpretation of any findings that may emerge. Such measurement error has been shown to contaminate the Polity index (Gleditsch and Ward 1997) . On the other hand, if a researcher supposes the phenomenon to be multidimensional and creates a separate indicator for each dimension, yet empirically those indicators are unidimensional, then collinearity will make it practically impossible to distinguish one from another (Bollen and Grandjean 1981) . This problem applies to Freedom House, which annually publishes separate indices of "political rights" and "civil liberties" that are always correlated at upwards of 0.90. The same situation prevailed in Bollen's indicators of "popular sovereignty" and "political liberty" (Bollen 1980) : in the most rigorous examination of dimensions of democracy to date, Bollen and Grandjean demonstrated that these two indicators were unidimensional, and were therefore better combined into a single indicator of "liberal democracy" (Bollen and Grandjean 1981) . Here, using a larger set of variables, we identify two dimensions of democracy as Dahl's contestation and inclusiveness.
The identification of these two dimensions grounds them firmly in democratic theory. "Polyarchy" was Dahl's term for real-world approximations of true democracy, which he considered an unattainable ideal-type regime in which governments would be completely responsive to the will of their citizens (Dahl and Lindblom 1953) . Although "polyarchy" has not displaced "democracy" in the political science lexicon, it has become one of the most familiar standards for democracy. Dahl defined polyarchy as the existence of eight institutional guarantees: freedom of organization, freedom of expression, the right to vote, broad eligibility for public office, the right to compete for support and votes, the availability of alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, and the dependence of public policies on citizens' preferences.
However, he also argued that these eight guarantees corresponded to two underlying dimensions --contestation and inclusiveness. There is contestation when citizens "have unimpaired opportunities. . . 1. To formulate their preferences, 2. To signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action, 3. To have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government…" (Dahl 1971 2) . Inclusiveness is variation "in the proportion of the population entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of the government. . ." (Dahl 1971 4) . His identification of these two dimensions was both a conceptual and an empirical claim. Conceptually, it was a claim that there is a logical or definitional correspondence between the eight institutional guarantees and either, or both, of these two dimensions. For example, freedom of expression logically corresponds primarily to the aspects of contestation that involve unimpaired opportunities to formulate and signify preferences; the right to vote logically corresponds to the proportion of the population entitled to participate, or inclusiveness.
Some guarantees correspond to both. For example, holding elections both allows contestation to occur and includes more of the population in important decisions. What matters is that these guarantees can be understood as reflections of these two dimensions, rather than dimensions that are not part of polyarchy, such as economic efficiency.
Dahl's empirical claim was that the defining components of polyarchy reflect these dimensions not only conceptually, but also empirically. That is, indicators of democracy that primarily measure inclusiveness should va ry together, indicators that primarily measure contestation should vary together, and some indicators of democracy may vary with both kinds, but the indicators of inclusiveness should covary less with indicators of contestation than they do with one anothe r, and vice versa. It is useful to reduce polyarchy to these two dimensions only if these expected patterns of empirical association are correct. For example, it makes sense to combine indicators of the right to vote and broad eligibility for public office into the dimension of inclusiveness only if countries that have extensive suffrage also allow most adult citizens to run for public office, and if countries that restrict eligibility for public office also tend to restrict the suffrage. If this empirical relationship is strong, these two institutional guarantees are empirically unidimensional; otherwise, they are more usefully treated as lying on separate dimensions. Similarly, many other indicators should be primarily associated with contestation. For exa mple, countries that guarantee freedom of organization would also hold competitive elections; those that censor the media would also ban political parties; and so on. But Dahl speculated that "contestation and inclusiveness vary somewhat independently" (Dahl 1971 4) , and therefore contestation and inclusiveness are best treated as two separate dimensions.
Also implicit in Dahl's claim was the assumption that these two dimensions are generally fundamental, i.e., not artifacts of a particular year or world region, and not disturbed when particular countries change, becoming more democratic or less so. This claim is implied by his references to variation in contestation and inclusiveness "both historically and at the present time" (Dahl 1971 4) and in "the 140 nominally independent countries existing in 1969" (Dahl 1971 11) , and his use of examples from the eighteenth century to the 1960s.
If it is useful to speak of dimensions of contestation and inclusiveness, the dimensions must make conceptual sense and be empirically sound. The truth of one does not imply the truth of the other. Conceptual distinctions and similarities that seem to be perfectly logical can turn out to be hard to reconcile with empirical evidence, and robust empirical associations sometimes have no defensible conceptual interpretation.
Dahl made influential arguments for his theoretical dimensions that need not be repeated here (Dahl 1971; Dahl 1989) ; this article tests the claims about empirical dimensions. For Dahl's empirical conjecture to be true, three interrelated empirical claims must hold: that some aspects of democracy covary along a dimension of contestation, that other aspects covary along a relatively independent dimension of inclusiveness, and that these relationships are extensive in time and space and robust to the fluctuations of individual countries. Thus, it is easy to imagine hypothetical situations that would falsify them. For example, all of Dahl's institutional guarantees could vary independently, or they could be more usefully grouped into three dimensions (such as inclusiveness, political rights, and civil liberties) rather than two, into one dimension of democracy, or into alternative dimensions, such as decentralization and individualism, that have nothing to do with regimes. In any dimensional analysis of democracy indicators that contain measurement error, it is also hypothetically possible to identify dimensions that are not related to democracy, such as state capacity, geographic proximity, cultural affinity, or ideological orientations. It is also conceivable that any of these patterns of covariation could turn out to be a statistical fluke due to a temporary alignment of certain countries at a certain point in time.
Data requirements have made rigorous testing of these empirical implications difficult. A test of the number and nature of dimensions in democracy (or polyarchy) requires many different indicators of democracy that capture different aspects of democracy, measured for many countries, ideally over a long period of time. One project that partially tested this relationship was Coppedge and Reinicke's Guttman scalogram analysis of polyarchy, which confirmed that four indicators of contestation -fair elections, freedom of organization, freedom of expression, and media pluralism -were unidimensional and lay on a different dimension from the breadth of the suffrage (Coppedge and Reinicke 1990). However, their suffrage indicator was a single variable, which was insufficient to confirm the unidimensionality of various aspects of inclusiveness. Also, although this study used a large sample, it used data from 1985 only and therefore could not establish that the unidimensionality of contestation was consistent over time. A study by Bollen and Grandjean found that six indicators of democracy circa 1960 were unidimensional (Bollen and Grandjean 1981 
Methodology
If Dahl's conjecture that there are two dimensions of polyarchy is correct, and if some of the best existing indicators do a good job of capturing some aspects of both dimensions of polyarchy, then exploratory factor analysis should identify these two underlying dimensions. This is true even if some or all of the indicators also measure some other aspects of democracy and even if they contain some random error. Factor analysis seeks to define the latent variables that could most efficiently predic t a set of actual variables. Exploratory factor analysis is often regarded as more of an art than a science for two reasons. The first is that it does not identify a unique factor: any linear transformation of a factor (a "rotation") would be associated with the variables equally well. The factor analyst therefore exercises discretion in choosing a rotation. The second reason for considering this process an art is that the underlying dimension is latent, and is therefore subject to interpretation by the analyst.
The standard solution to the problem of subjective interpretation is to use confirmatory, rather than exploratory, factor analysis. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) defines a priori the nature of the latent dimensions to be measured and proposes a hypothesis about which variables will be most useful for measuring each dimension. This hypothesis is then tested, and it can be tested against alternative hypotheses. This procedure makes the most of strong conceptual guidance, which is a good practice as that a superior alternative, rather than a straw man, will be tested.
In such situations, it can be more fruitful to use exploratory factor analysis, which has complementary strengths and weaknesses (DeVellis 2003 132-33 ). An exploratory analysis offers only weak guidance about how to interpret the dimensions that it produces, but it wears no conceptual blinders that might prevent the researcher from detecting the empirically most natural dimensions contained in the data. In fact, it is a test of one particular grouping of variables into dimensions against all other possible groupings. If any unidimensional hypothesis were superior, the Eigenvalue of the second dimension would be less than one; if a third or more dimensions were justified, their Eige nvalues would be greater than one. And although variables could be grouped differently on the same number of dimensions, any such solution would be less efficient.
For some purposes, therefore, it is more useful to explore than to confirm, provided that one has the means to interpret what one discovers during the exploration.
The kind of factor analysis we used is principal components analysis, so we will refer to the dimensions as "components" and the factor loadings as "component weights."
We chose an oblique rotation, which allows the two dimensions to be correlated while Recruitment reflects the size of the selectorate for public offices, from hereditary succession, to designation by an elite body, to competitive election.
Known regimes are in appropriate locations.
Further evidence for the identification of these two components with Dahl's dimensions comes from a bivariate scatterplot of the component scores. Germany, Belgium, Greece, Switzerland, and New Zealand. These countries are located on different continents, have both parliamentary and presidential constitutions, two-party and multiparty systems, and vary in levels of economic development. What they have in common is polyarchy. Polyarchies should be located in a corner corresponding to a high degree of inclusiveness and a high degree of contestation. If the vertical axis is contestation and the horizontal axis is inclusiveness, then these polyarchies are where we would expect them to be.
[ Figure 1 about here]
In the lower left of Figure Perhaps most strikingly, the upper-left corner is empty. This is where Dahl's "competitive oligarchies" would be found: pre-democratic regimes with some competition among elites but without true mass elections. If our data extended back to the mid-19 th century, perhaps this corner would be populated. But the fact that such regimes are extinct and this corner is empty lends additional support to our interpretation. 
Income predicts Component 1 like it predicts known indicators of contestation.
Nomological/construct validation can be accomplished by examining the relationship of these components with per capita GDP (Adcock and Collier 2001 542) .
The logic of this test is that if the same things that explain other indicators of democracy also explain these components, then they probably measure a very similar concept. It has been well established that, in cross-national samples, democracy is associated with the log of per capita GDP. (Debate and research are still ongoing about the reasons for this association; our analysis requires only an empirical association.) But which dimension of democracy is expected to be associated with per capita GDP: contestation or inclusiveness? Expectations have not been precisely defined because a separate indicator of inclusiveness has not existed. However, we believe that the strongest association should be between per capita GDP and contestation, simply because the analyses that gave rise to the generalization in the first place almost always employed indicators that capture contestation more than inclusiveness. As Table 2 shows, this expectation is correct: in our 1985 sample, logged per capita GDP is a significant predictor of [ Table 2 about here]
Persistence over Time
All of the evidence so far has used data from a single year. Although we are convinced that we can safely infer the existence of Dahl's two dimensions for 1985, we are more interested in the more general possibility that these same two dimensions existed consistently over a period of decades. In this section we provide evidence that contestation and inclusiveness were the two principal components of democracy every year from 1950 to 2000. We offer six additional kinds of evidence: that 6) exploratory principal components analysis returns two dimensions almost every year; 7) the same indicators load most heavily on the same dimensions in each year; 8) the same two components are extracted even when some indicators are dropped; 9) correlations are high in adjacent years and decay over time; 10) in all years we observe the same tripolar distribution of cases between the democratic, authoritarian, and inclusive-he gemony poles; and 11) the same overall distribution prevails even when individual countries change position within the distribution. [ Table 3 about here]
8. The same components emerge even when some variables are dropped or added.
We replicated the analysis using the different sets of indicators that were available for different years. Tables 4 and 5 Further confirmation that the two components are the same in each year comes from years. This is exactly the pattern found in Table 6 : for each component, correlations in adjacent years are always highest (albeit lower for Inclusiveness due to its greater measurement error), and they diminish as time passes and countries change. It is doubtful that anything but the close similarity of the dimensions being measured could produce such high adjacent correlations and their gradual diminution over time.
6
[ Table 6 about here]
The tripolar distribution persists.
The tripolar distribution of countries that we found for 1985 is reproduced in [ Figure 2 about here]
The overall pattern persists even when individual countries change.
The final piece of evidence confirming Dahl's conjecture is the stability of the tripolar distribution despite the movements of the countries within it. If democracy is truly structured along the two dimensions that Dahl proposed, then these two dimensions should continue to capture the most fundamental aspects -the principal components -of regimes even when individual countries change regimes or their level of democracy.
What remains to be shown is that some countries change their scores and positions in this two-dimensional space. It is also important to determine whether the countries' component scores change in ways that one would expect, knowing their political histories. [ Figure 3 about here]
Conclusions
Democracy is a complex, multifaceted concept: so complex that it has to be simplified before it can be measured and subjected to empirical analysis. Dahl proposed one simplification: a focus on certain aspects of democracy that he called polyarchy, which he claimed had two dimensions. Our analysis gives an empirical foundation to Dahl's two theoretical dimensions of democracy. There are two dimensions, they are the same dimensions about which Dahl theorized, and they have been remarkably persistent for a large number of countries for several decades. On both theoretical and empirical grounds, therefore, there is a strong presumption in fa vor of the heuristic and empirical value of treating democracy as possessing these two dimensions, at least for the latter half of the 20 th century.
Some of our eleven tests are less rigorous than others, i.e., they admit different interpretations. However, the tests reinforce one another and are collectively more rigorous than any one test in isolation. The logic is the same as that of the familiar "duck"
analogy: a puffin can walk like a duck, a hunter's call can quack like a duck, and a decoy can look like a duck; but if a creature walks, talks, and looks like a duck, it is a duck.
After passing eleven tests, the evidence that these are Dahl's two dimensions is solid.
One caveat is that our findings necessarily reflect the aspects of democracy measured by the indicators included in our analysis, which are in turn limited to the aspects that other scholars have chosen to measure. An exploratory analysis of a more diverse set of variables could well reveal three or more dimensions. We do not claim that contestation and inclusiveness capture everything there is to know about democracy. In A final implication of our study is that most quantitative research on democratization has actually concerned contestation. This can be seen in the fact that the most commonly used indicators of democracy --most of the Polity Index and both
Freedom House indices -load on the contestation dimension. Therefore, the inclusiveness dimension has been neglected. One of the limitations of studying inclusiveness is that it has been operationalized very narrowly, almost always being reduced to the breadth of the suffrage. *These variables were taken from Bollen's compilation, which rescaled them to a (0,10) interval, which 10 indicating greater democracy.
Endnotes
1 One quality that is less than ideal is the ordinal nature of most of the variables analyzed.
Obviously, interval-level data would be preferable, but the fact that such strong, robust components emerged in spite of the ordinal data strengthens our conclusions.
2 Although our two dimensions are correlated at about .500, this correlation is too small to justify treating the components as unidimensional. Cf. Bollen and Grandjean (1981) 655 who could barely rule out two factors even when they were correlated at .94.
3 Three of our variables overlapped with those used by Bollen (1980) : Party Legitimacy, Effective Executive Selection (Effec), and Leg, the product of Legef by Legsel. 4 We say "ostensibly" because although Freedom House has published long lists of items that it claims to take into account, there has never been a clear description of the procedure by which such information is used to generate its ratings (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Our description here is based on Bollen's unusually clear and categorical interpretations (Bollen 1998 37 and 46) . 5 We calculated our component scores using the most common procedure, the regression method. The units of measurement are standard deviations.
6 Serially correlated measurement errors could produce a similar pattern, but only if a) most of what these components are capturing were measurement error -otherwise the correlations would not be above .90 in adjacent years -and b) the degree of error -for example, biases on the part of the many researchers who contributed to the construction of the variables -were amazingly consistent over several decades.
7 These scores were standardized to make them comparable over time. This is necessary because the annual PCAs constrained the mean for each year to zero and the standard deviation for each to one, which obscured year-to-year variation in mean scores and their dispersion. We thank Carlos Gervasoni for pointing this out and suggesting part of the solution that we adopted. To correct for this problem, we repeated the PCA in each of the three pooled samples and calculated the means and standard deviations for contestation and inclusiveness by year. These means track the waves of authoritarianism and democratization in the 1960s and 1970s well. The standardized score on each dimension is then the original score multiplied by the annual standard deviation, plus the annual mean score. For the years with overlapping samples (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) , the means and standard deviations were chained forward from the 1981 scores based on the average changes in both samples, and from the 1988 scores based on the changes in the most recent sample.
The correlations between original and standardized scores are at least .96 for both dimensions. Figure 2 looks very similar using either set of scores. Standard errors are in parentheses, followed by t-statistics. Mean component weights with an absolute value greater than .500 are in bold. 1950-1971 1972-1988 1981-2000 1950-1971 1972-1988 1981- 1950 and 1965, 1951 and 1966, 1952 and 1967, 1953 and 1968, 1954 and 1969, 1955 and 1970, and 1956 and 1971 . 
Note: Where samples overlap, the 1972-1988 sample was used. All observations in this plot were standardized using the procedure described in note 7.
Figure 3: Paths Taken by Several Countries
Data labels are the last two digits of the corresponding year. All observations in these plots were standardized using the procedure described in note 7. 
